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WHAT IS PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER?  THE SUPREME COURT 
DISMISSED LABCORP V. METABOLITE 
LABORATORIES, BUT THE ISSUE IS NOT 
GOING AWAY 
SUE ANN MOTA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Patent law seeks to strike a balance regarding patentable subject 
matter between overprotection, which can impede the free exchange of 
ideas, and underprotection, which can lessen the incentive to invent.1  
Thus, what actually constitutes patentable subject matter under the 
Patent Act2 is an important question and a question that the U.S. 
Supreme Court avoided in June 2006 by dismissing Laboratory Corp. of 
America Holdings (LabCorp) v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.3 
Section 101 of the Patent Act regarding patentable subject matter 
was not argued in the court below so the Court did not decide LabCorp 
on the patentable subject matter issue.4  Future litigants, however, will 
not likely neglect to argue this so the Court will no doubt face this issue 
again.  This article will examine the LabCorp case and the issue of 
patentable subject matter, concluding with recommendations for when 
the issue is raised by subsequent litigants.  It seems probable that the 
Court will again address the subject of statutory subject matter on a case 
 
*  Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University.  J.D., University of Toledo 
College of Law, Order of the Coif; B.A., M.A., Bowling Green State University. 
 1. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (LabCorp) v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 
2922–23 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 3. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2921. 
 4. Id. at 2922–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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brought properly before it and will strike the balance that will 
encourage innovation but will not extend protection to processes or 
business methods that are merely ideas, phenomena of nature, or laws 
of nature. 
I.  PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
 “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”5  Pursuant to this power, Congress passed several patent 
acts, starting with the Patent Act of 1790, which allowed one who 
“invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, 
or device, or any improvement” not known or used before to petition 
for a patent.6  The Patent Act of 1793 allowed an inventor to obtain 
letters patent for “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement.”7  The 
Patent Act of 1836 again protected “any art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter” and provided the foundation of the modern 
American system.8  The Patent Act of 1870 again revised patent law.9 
Under the current patent law, as originally enacted through the 
Patent Act of 1952, an inventor may obtain a patent for “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement.”10  Congress replaced the term “art” from 
prior acts with “process.”11 
The Court has interpreted patentable subject matter numerous 
times.  An illustrative and nonexhaustive discussion of key cases follows. 
In 1854, the Supreme Court considered one of Samuel Morse’s 
claims regarding his patent on the electromagnetic telegraph in O’Reilly 
v. Morse.12  Morse’s eighth claim on the patent for use of the motive 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8. 
 6. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 7. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23 (1793) (repealed 1836). 
 8. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 117–25 (1836) (amended 1870). 
 9. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 198–217 (1870) (repealed 1952).  Note that 
this historical outline includes only major revisions. 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  Congress intended the statutory subject matter to include 
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”  S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted 
in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
 11. Compare Patent Act of 1870, and Patent Act of 1836, and Patent Act of 1793, and 
Patent Act of 1790, with 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 12. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).  The Court stated that “[i]t is 
difficult to make a fair report of this case without writing a book.  The arguments of counsel 
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power of electric current, or electromagnetism, designed for making or 
printing letters or characters at a distance,13 was deemed overbroad by 
the Court.14  Generally, the use of natural phenomena cannot be 
patented.15 
The Court in 1972 in Gottschalk v. Benson16 held that a method of 
computer programming to convert binary-coded-decimal numbers into 
pure numbers, which was not limited to any particular art or technology, 
was not a patentable process.  The Court cited Morse when reaching the 
conclusion that a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, may not be 
patented.17  Ideas, phenomena of nature, and algorithms are not 
patentable,18 as they are the basic tools of scientific and technical work.19 
The Court in Parker v. Flook20 in 1978, citing both Morse and 
Gottschalk, held that a method for updating alarm limits during a 
catalytic conversion process was not patentable subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.21  The Court stated that this case turned on the proper 
construction of § 101.22  The plain language of this section does not 
answer the question, and the line between a patentable process23 and an 
unpatentable principle is not always clear.  The Court concluded that 
the patent application contained no claim of a patentable invention, as 
the processes involved in catalytic conversion were well-known, and the 
application simply provided for new methods of calculating alarm limit 
values.24 
 
would fill a volume by themselves.”  Id. at 63. 
 13. Id. at 112. 
 14. Id. at 116. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 17. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69–70 (citing Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone 
Cases), 126 U.S. 1 (1888)). 
 18. Id. at 73 (finding that further action by Congress on the patentability of computer 
programs was needed). 
 19. Id. at 67. 
 20. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (finding that the only novel feature of the 
method was an algorithm). 
 21. Id. at 584. 
 22. Id. at 590. 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2000) (stating that “‘process’ means process, art or method, and 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material”). 
 24. Parker, 437 U.S. at 595.  The Court stated that it must proceed cautiously when 
extending patent rights into areas wholly unseen by Congress.  Id. at 596. 
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The Court again construed § 101 in 1980 in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty25 and held that a live, human-made, genetically engineered 
bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil was a patentable subject 
matter.26  While Congress has the role of defining patentable subject 
matter in § 101, the courts must construe Congress’s language.  Finding 
no ambiguity in the statute,27 the Court found that the language covered 
Chakrabarty’s invention.28  This does not mean, however, that § 101 has 
no limits or embraces every discovery.  Citing Morse, Gottschalk, and 
Parker, the Court found that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas were not patentable.29  Similarly, a new mineral 
discovered in the earth or a new plant discovered in the wild could not 
be patented, just as Einstein’s equation and Newton’s law of gravity 
could not be patented.30 
The Court interpreted patentable subject matter again in the 1981 
case of Diamond v. Diehr,31 holding that a physical and chemical process 
of curing synthetic rubber fell within the statutory subject matter 
requirements, even though a mathematical equation and computer 
program were used in several steps of the process.32  While mathematical 
formulae and laws of nature are outside the statutory subject matter,33 
the subject matter for which a patent was sought in Diehr was defined as 
a process.34  Citing Chakrabarty, which had been decided in the prior 
Term, the Court examined the statute and reached the conclusion that 
such industrial processes have historically been eligible for patent 
protection.35 
Against this backdrop of Supreme Court statutory jurisprudence, the 
dissent in the Supreme Court’s dismissal of LabCorp36 reached its 
conclusion. 
 
 25. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 26. Id. at 305 (stating that no naturally occurring bacteria had this property). 
 27. Id. at 315. 
 28. Id. at 318.  Congress could amend § 101 to exclude organisms produced by genetic 
engineering or draft a statute specifically covering them, but until it does, the Court interprets 
the existing statute to include such things as patentable subject matter.  Id. 
 29. Id. at 309. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 32. Id. at 184. 
 33. Id. at 185 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63 (1972)). 
 34. Id. at 184–85. 
 35. Id. at 184. 
 36. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (LabCorp) v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 
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II.  LABCORP 
In the 1980s, three university doctors conducted medical research on 
vitamin deficiencies and discovered a correlation between high blood 
levels of homocysteine and deficiencies of folate (folic acid) and 
cobalamin (vitamin B12).
37  The researchers developed more accurate 
homocysteine tests using a gas chromatography and mass spectrometry 
method; they then published their findings and applied for a patent.38 
Patent number 4,970,658 (the ’658 Patent) was issued to the 
inventors in 1990 for a method for determining total homocysteine 
levels, including methods for detecting cobalamin and folic acid 
deficiencies using an assay for total homocysteine levels and methods 
for distinguishing cobalamin deficiency from folic acid deficiency using 
an assay for total homocysteine levels in conjunction with an assay for 
methylmalonic acid.39  The claim at issue was claim number thirteen, 
which contained a method for detecting a cobalamin or folate deficiency 
using the steps of “assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total 
homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in 
said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.”40 
The inventors’ universities assigned the ’658 Patent to University 
Patents, Inc., which later became Competitive Technologies, Inc.41  
Competitive Technologies then granted a license of the ’658 Patent to 
Metabolite Laboratories.42  Metabolite sublicensed the patent to Roche 
Biomedical Laboratories, which is now LabCorp.43  In 1998, LabCorp 
 
2922–29 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 2923. 
 38. Id. 
 39. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20, 1986) (issued July 10, 1990).  Accurate and 
early diagnosis of these deficiencies is important because these deficiencies can lead to life-
threatening hematologic abnormalities that are completely reversible with cobalamin or 
folate.  Id. col.1 ll.32–44. 
 40. Id. col.41 ll.61–65.  The original claim number thirteen for a ‘“method for detecting 
a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals by assaying body fluid for the 
presence of elevated levels of total homocysteine’” was rejected by the examiner.  Brief for 
Respondents at 5, LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607).  The inventors then added the 
discrete, sequential “correlating” step.  Id. at 6. 
 41. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006); Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 6.  
Competitive Technologies licenses the technological developments of colleges and 
universities to industry.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 6. 
 42. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 6.  The University of Colorado had 
established Metabolite Laboratories to practice the invention and spark industry interest.  Id. 
 43. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359.  LabCorp was to pay Competitive Technologies a six 
percent royalty for the patent sublicense and additionally to pay Metabolite Laboratories a 
separate 21.5% royalty for the know-how license on homocysteine assays.  Brief for 
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switched to a total homocysteine assay developed by Abbott 
Laboratories and stopped paying royalties to Metabolite Laboratories.44 
Competitive Technologies sued LabCorp for patent infringement, 
inducing infringement, and contributory infringement; Metabolite 
Laboratories sued LabCorp for breach of the license agreement.45  The 
district court held a Markman hearing46 to construe terms of the patent 
claims.  The term “correlating” in claim thirteen was construed to be 
one of several ‘“discrete, sequential process steps.’”47  “Correlating,” 
according to the court, is a verb that means more than a simple 
existence of a relationship between a high level of homocysteine and 
deficiency in cobalamin or folate, and instead it indicates the 
establishment of a mutual or reciprocal relationship.48 
A jury found that LabCorp breached its license agreement with 
Metabolite Laboratories, that LabCorp willfully infringed the ’658 
Patent, and that the claims were not invalid.49  The jury determined 
damages of over $3,650,000 for breach of contract and over $1,000,000 
for patent infringement.50  The district court doubled the infringement 
damages for willfulness and permanently enjoined LabCorp from using 
the Abbott test.51  LabCorp appealed.52 
 
Respondents, supra note 40, at 7 n.4. 
 44. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359. 
 45. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 8. 
 46. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that 
“construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the 
province of the court”).  See generally Sue Ann Mota, Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc.:  Patent Construction Is Within the Exclusive Province of the Court Under the Seventh 
Amendment, 3 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (1997). 
 47. Joint Appendix, Volume I at 60, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (LabCorp) v. 
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.53  On appeal, 
the court first reviewed the district court’s claim construction.  The 
claim language, itself, governs, using the understanding of those with 
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.54  The court 
affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the correlation step in 
claim thirteen.55  Similarly, the appeals court found substantial evidence 
to support the jury’s verdict on infringement.56  LabCorp also argued on 
appeal that claim thirteen was invalid, but the appeals court rejected this 
as well.57  The appeals court also affirmed the jury’s finding that 
LabCorp breached the license agreement.58 
LabCorp did not challenge the jury’s willfulness finding, but rather, 
appealed contending that the district court did not discuss the factors for 
enhanced damages.59  While the Federal Circuit has a strong preference 
 
 53. Id. at 1372.  See generally Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence 
Posts:  Property Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 623, 666 n.194 (2005); Steven C. Cherny et al., 2004 Patent Law Decisions of the 
Federal Circuit, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 941, 1117–18 (2005); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent 
Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 49, 61 n.30 (2005); John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction:  The Doctrine of 
Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 781, 807 (2005); 
Jessica L. Kaiser, Note & Comment, What’s That Mean?  A Proposed Claim Construction 
Methodology for Phillips v. AWH Corp., 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1011 n.12 (2005). 
 54. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1362.  In most cases, the best source for determining the 
context is the specification.  The specification confirms that the claim language does not 
require as part of the method that the elevated level causes some bad symptoms.  Id. 
 55. Id. at 1364. 
 56. Id.  The jury found LabCorp liable for indirect infringement, which requires a 
finding of direct infringement to support it.  Id.  Physicians directly infringed by ordering the 
assays and carrying out the correlating step after receiving the results from LabCorp.  Id.  The 
appeals court affirmed the finding of LabCorp’s indirect infringement and did not consider 
contributory infringement.  Id. at 1364–65. 
 57. Id. at 1368.  LabCorp argued that claim thirteen was invalid on the grounds of 
indefiniteness, lack of a written description and enablement, anticipation, and obviousness.  
Id. at 1365.  Concerning the argument that the correlating step in claim thirteen was 
indefinite, the appeals court cited 35 U.S.C. § 112 and stated that it was not indefinite.  Id. at 
1366.  Under § 112, there is both the written description and enablement for sufficiency of the 
specification.  Id.  Claim thirteen is not obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.  Id. at 1368.  The prior 
art also did not anticipate claim thirteen under 35 U.S.C. § 102, according to the appeals 
court.  Id. at 1367. 
LabCorp also raised the same issues concerning claim eighteen, but the court of appeals 
vacated the district court’s advisory opinion on that claim due to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 1368–69. 
 58. Id. at 1369–70.  The contract interpretation was governed by state law.  Id. at 1369. 
 59. Id. at 1370; see Read v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (listing 
factors for enhanced damages).  The factors to be weighed for enhancing damages include:  
whether the infringer deliberately copied another’s ideas or design; whether the infringer 
knew of the patent holder’s patent protection, investigated the issue, and had a good-faith 
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for the district court to set forth its rationale, its failure to do so is at 
most harmless error.60  Finally, while LabCorp argued that the 
injunction was overbroad, the injunction simply addressed LabCorp’s 
specific acts, according to the appeals court.61  Thus, the district court’s 
decision was affirmed.62 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider the third 
question in the petition: 
Whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, 
undescribed, and non-enabling step directing a party simply to 
“correlat[e]” test results can validly claim a monopoly over a 
basic scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that 
any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking 
about the relationship after looking at a test result.63 
On June 22, 2006, the writ of certiorari was dismissed by the Court 
as improvidently granted.64  The petitioner, LabCorp, argued in its brief 
to the Court that the answer to the question for which certiorari was 
granted was “no.”65  Citing Morse, LabCorp argued that claim thirteen 
involved no inventive process or device beyond the natural 
phenomenon it recited.66 
The respondents, Metabolite Laboratories and Competitive 
Technologies, argued in their brief to the Court that LabCorp’s 
contention that claim thirteen recited only natural phenomena was not 
pleaded in LabCorp’s answer, tried in or decided by the district court, 
raised in or addressed by the court of appeals, presented in the 
 
belief that the patent was invalid or not infringed; the infringer’s behavior as a party to the 
litigation; the infringer’s size and financial condition; the closeness of the case; the duration of 
the infringer’s misconduct; the infringer’s motivation for harm; and whether the defendant 
attempted to conceal his or her misconduct.  Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 60. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1371. 
 61. Id. at 1372. 
 62. Id.  With respect to the court’s decision, Circuit Judge Schall dissented only 
regarding the interpretation of claim thirteen.  Id. at 1372 (Schall, J., dissenting).  He believed 
the majority improperly expanded the scope of claim thirteen and would have remanded for 
the recalculation of damages.  Id. at 1372–74. 
 63. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (LabCorp) v. 
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607).  See generally Helen M. Beeman 
& Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law of Structural Biology, Genomics, 
and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 889 n.76 (2006); John A. Squires & Thomas 
S. Biemer, Patent Law 101:  Does a Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean that the 
USPTO Is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject Matter Question Right?, 46 IDEA 561, 586 
(2006). 
 64. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2921. 
 65. Brief for Petitioner at 2, LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607). 
 66. Id. at 18. 
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certiorari petition, nor included in the grant of certiorari.67  According to 
Metabolite Laboratories, “it is unlikely that there has ever been another 
case in the annals of this Court in which a party so clearly embraced 
every avenue for forfeiting a right in every court along the way.”68 
These contentions were also raised at oral argument before the 
Court, and the reasons for dismissing the case became clear by the 
questions raised by the Justices.69  Justice Kennedy asked counsel 
arguing for the petitioner to find something in the opinion of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that was wrong.70  Justice 
Kennedy did not receive a specific reply to the question.  Arguing for 
the respondents, Miguel Estrada stated that the judgment should be 
affirmed because LabCorp never asked the trial judge or the Federal 
Circuit to declare the patent claim invalid under § 101.71  The Deputy 
Solicitor General, as amicus curiae supporting petitioner LabCorp, 
ironically argued that parties should be held responsible for procedural 
errors.72  If the § 101 issue had been addressed by the Court, then 
defendants would have held this defense for a second trip to court as a 
way to tire the inventor and start over.  According to LabCorp’s amicus, 
“[t]hat’s no way to run a legal system.”73 
In June 2006, the Court agreed with Metabolite Laboratories and 
dismissed the case.74  Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and 
Souter, dissented.75  The writ should not have been dismissed, according 
to the dissenters, because the Court had authority to decide it, the Court 
said that it would decide it, the parties and amici briefed it, the question 
was not difficult, and the medical field and patients would have 
benefited from a decision.76 
 
 67. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 10–11. 
 68. Id.  The respondents further argued that if the Court did consider the § 101 issue, 
then claim thirteen was “drawn to statutory subject matter.”  Id. at 12. 
 69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 18, LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607). 
 70. Id. at 8–10.  When asked by Justice Stevens why § 101 was not quoted, LabCorp’s 
counsel responded that the Court, itself, never cited § 101 in such cases until 1972.  Id. at 49–
50. 
 71. Id. at 30.  Further, Estrada contended that “you’re being asked to tell [sic] trial court 
and three courts of appeals judges that they committed reversible error for failing to address 
a question that nobody ever asked them.”  Id. at 32. 
 72. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-
607). 
 73. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 69, at 46. 
 74. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2921. 
 75. Id. at 2922–23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 2921. 
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The dissent to the dismissal of the writ acknowledged a technical 
procedural reason77 as well as a practical reason78 for not answering the 
question for which the writ of certiorari was granted.  The dissent, 
however, found stronger reasons for reaching a decision in the case.  
The dissent believed the procedural objection was tenuous because 
LabCorp argued the essence of the claim, and there was no practical 
reason for refusing to decide the case.79  It was in the public interest, 
according to the dissent, to clarify the law sooner rather than later.80 
Despite the fact that the case was dismissed, the dissent turned to 
the merits.  Citing Morse, Flook, Chakrabarty, and Diehr, the dissent 
stated that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, such 
as a mathematical formula or the motive power of electromagnetism, 
may not be patented.81  Although non-patentable phenomena of nature 
are difficult to define,82 according to the dissent, the correlation between 
 
 77. Id. at 2925 (finding that LabCorp did not refer to § 101 in the lower courts). 
 78. Id. (suggesting that there is a “benefit” to be derived from the views of the Federal 
Circuit, which did not consider the issue). 
 79. Id. at 2925–26.  “Of course, further consideration by the Federal Circuit might help 
us reach a better decision . . . [but] the thoroughness of the briefing leads me to conclude that 
the extra time, cost, and uncertainty that further proceedings would engender are not worth 
the potential benefit.”  Id. at 2926. 
 80. Id. at 2926. 
 81. Id. at 2922. 
 82. Id. at 2926–27 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE 
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3 (2003) 
[hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/203/10/innovationrpt.pdf).  This 
study was also cited in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
which was decided the same Term.  126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
The FTC Report examines the proper balance of competition and patent laws; chapter three 
examines current innovation in selected industries.  FTC REPORT, supra.  Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in eBay, joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens, cited the FTC Report 
concerning patent non-practicing entities, which obtain and enforce patents but either have 
no product or do not create or sell a product vulnerable to infringement countersuit.  eBay, 
126 S. Ct. 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing FTC REPORT, supra).  See generally Sue Ann 
Mota, eBay v. MercExchange:  Traditional Focu-Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies to 
Patent Cases, According to the Supreme Court, AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).  The non-
practicing entities referred to in the FTC Report have also been called “patent trolls,” a term 
coined by Intel’s former patent chief Peter Detkin.  Nicholas Varchaver, Who’s Afraid of 
Nathan Myhrvold?, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 110. 
Justice Breyer cited the FTC Report on the need for strong patent protection in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries to spur innovation.  LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2926 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing FTC REPORT, supra).  Justice Breyer also cited a law review 
article on the issue of the industry-specified nature of innovation.  Id. at 2926–27 (citing Dan 
L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577–89 
(2003)). 
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homocysteine and vitamin deficiency constituted a natural 
phenomenon.83 
The dissent to the dismissal of the writ further stated that even if the 
dissent was wrong on the merits, there would still have been value in 
deciding the case to avoid uncertainty in the future84 and to contribute to 
the ongoing discussion of whether patent laws keep the necessary 
careful balance between overprotection and underprotection.85 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ in LabCorp86 in June 2006 as 
improvidently granted, but the issue of patentable subject matter is not 
going away.  The Court, in this author’s opinion, properly refused to 
decide an issue not argued or decided below and for which LabCorp 
could not point to reversible error in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.87  Anxious to get to the merits, the dissent from the 
dismissal would have decided the case despite what the dissent 
acknowledged to be a “tenuous” procedural roadblock.88  On the merits, 
the three dissenters would have found claim thirteen invalid.89 
 
 83. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Claim thirteen’s process is 
merely for the user to obtain test results and think about them.  Id.  Neither the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), nor the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), help the respondents according to the dissent.  LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2927–28 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  The dissent further states that the statement in State Street Bank that 
a process is patentable if it produces a useful, tangible, concrete result, State St. Bank, 149 
F.3d at 1373, has never been stated by the Court.  LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2927–28 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 84. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2929 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 2922.  The dissent cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay, which all of 
the dissenters to this dismissal joined.  Id. at 2929 (citing eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842).  The 
dissent in LabCorp also cited Robert Pitofsky, Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New 
Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2001) (stating that competition policies need to 
adjust to the new economy and intellectual property policy must also be revisited), and Malla 
Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents:  Common Sense, 
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. 
L.J. 61 (2002) (concluding that there are four arguments for the unconstitutionality of 
business method patents). 
 86. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2921. 
 87. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 65, at 13. 
 88. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 69, at 8–10.  This author agrees with the 
Deputy Solicitor General that such a ruling would result in legal counsel holding arguments 
in reserve to raise later and that is not how the legal system should be run. 
 89. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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This outcome leaves LabCorp liable for the damages for 
infringement and breach of contract,90 although three members of the 
Court were willing to aid LabCorp.  It seems probable that in a future 
case, parties will properly plead, argue, and, if necessary, appeal the 
issue of statutory subject matter under § 101.  If the Court grants 
certiorari on the issue, Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter have 
indicated in LabCorp their concern with the statutory subject matter,91 
and they provided the foundation for a future decision.  Justice 
Kennedy, who was joined by those Justices in a concurrence in another 
patent case in the same Term, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,92 also 
patiently awaits the issue to appear properly before the Court.  If these 
four can get at least one more member of the Court to agree, the Court 
will address the subject matter issue and restore the proper balance of 
patent protection93 to ensure the continued incentive to innovate.  
Business methods and processes that are mere ideas or phenomena of 
nature will likely be addressed by this Court,94 which may draw the line 




 90. See id. at 2921 (majority opinion). 
 91. Id. at 2921–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 92. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
 93. See LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2922–23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 94. The Court may also carefully address non-practicing entities as well.  Based on his 
concurrence in eBay, Justice Kennedy seems poised to tackle the technological issues in the 
new economy.   eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
